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NIETZSCHE AND ARETAIC LEGAL THEORY 
Kyron Huigens 
INTRODUCTION 
What do ascetic ideals mean? Nietzsche answered this 
question regarding artists, women, the disabled, the disgruntled, 
priests, philosophers, Wagner, Schopenhauer, free-thinkers, and 
scientists.^ I want to answer it regarding Anglo-American legal 
theorists. Nietzsche also offered advice on how to escape 
asceticism, and I want to show how legal theorists ought to take 
that advice. Anglo-American legal theory is, in all its present 
varieties, imbued with slave morahty and nihihsm. It can be 
imbued with the aristocratic ideal and master morality. Nietzsche 
points us in the direction of aretaic legal theory—^that is, a legal 
theory premised on virtue ethics. I will show how Nietzsche does 
this and what it means in the theory of punishment—a subject that 
Nietzsche treats at length in the Genealogy of Morality. The 
aretaic is a significant theme in Nietzsche's work, but it has been 
neglected by legal theorists.^ Post-modernists have focused almost 
exclusively on Nietzsche's perspectivism and its implications for 
legal language and the law's claim to authority. To some, the idea 
of indeterminacy in language, value, and meaning has proved to be 
endlessly fascinating. But when it is read in this way, 
perspectivism is at most a peripheral concern in Nietzsche's 
thought. The principal statement of perspectivism in Essay III, 
section 12 (III.12.) of Genealogy, for example, is a digression.^ The 
next section, III.13, begins with the sentence "[b]ut to return," and 
the subject to which Nietzsche returns is the ascetic ideal's pitting 
1 See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALITY 72-128 (Keith 
Ansell-Pearson ed., Carol Diethe trans., 1994). 
2 See Robert C. Solomon, Nietzsche ad hominem: Perspectivism, Personality, and 
Ressentiment Revisited, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO NIETZSCHE 180, 211 
(Bemd Magnus & Kathleen M. Higgins eds., 1996) (describing Nietzsche's objective in 
moral theory as "an ethics of the virtues not unlike Aristotle's"). 
3 See NIETZSCHE, supra note 1, at 92 (describing objectivity as exercising power over 
perspective instead of over detached observation). 
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death against life, inducing nausea in man, and increasing the 
power of the priestly caste.'' These are among Nietzsche's main 
concerns in the Genealogy as a whole, and an exclusive focus on 
his perspectivism runs the risk of serious misunderstanding. An 
obsessive concern with indeterminacy in language, value, and 
meaning effectively aspires to a kind of austerity of thought and 
commitment that is unambiguously nihilistic and unambiguously 
condemned by Nietzsche.^ There is a Yes in Nietzsche's work, not 
merely a No, and it is the Yes that I want to emphasize. 
The main thrust of Nietzsche's argument in the Genealogy of 
Morality is famihar to any moderately serious student of his 
thought. The triumph of Judeo-Christian values and categories is 
the philosophical equivalent of a successful slave revolt. The 
classical ideal of man stresses his active, warrior side: man's power, 
courage, ruthlessness, his joy at being ahve, and his wilhngness to 
dominate. The good is that which pertains to this flourishing of 
human energy and activity. The good is the noble, the successful, 
the naturally aristocratic. The bad is the lowly, the base, the 
humble.® But this is an ordering of the world that lowly, base, 
humbled people cannot abide, and the devious genius of 
Christianity, for Nietzsche, is that it inverts the morality of the 
aristocratic masters. It identifies the good with the quahties of 
slaves—^the meek, the weak, and the powerless—^and promises that 
they shall inherit the earth.^ The good becomes a matter of purity, 
self-abnegation, deprivation—^the ascetic ideal—which ultimately 
leads to self-loathing and nihilism.^ 
Part of the recovery of the aristocratic ideal is indeed the 
'' See id. at 93. 
^ Consider this passage from Genealogy. 
[Modem historiography] rejects all teleology, it does not want to "prove" 
anything any more; it scoms playing the judge, and shows good taste there,—it 
affirms as little as it denies, it asserts and "describes".... All this is ascetic to a 
high degree; but to an even higher degree it is nihilistic, make no mistcike about 
it! You see a sad, hard but determined gaze,—an eye peers out, like a lone 
explorer at the North Pole (perhaps so as not to peer in? or peer back?...). 
Here there is snow, here life is silenced; the last crows heard here are called 
"what for?," "in vain", "ruida"—here nothing flourishes or grows any more ... 
Id. at 123. Incidentally, there are remarkable echoes of this passage in the early modernist 
poems of Wallace Stevens, especially in The Snow Man, in which Stevens writes, "[ojne 
must have a mind of winter/ To regard the frost and the boughs/ Of the pine-trees cmsted 
with snow" and to be "the listener, who listens in the snowy And, nothing himsp.lf 
beholds/ Nothing that is not there and the nothing that is." WALLACE STEVENS, The 
Snow Man, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF WALLACE STEVENS 9-10 (1957). Stevens's 
later poems, such as Landscape with Boat, seem to overcome this nihilism. See id. at 241 
("An anti-master man, floribimd ascetic "). 
® See NIETZSCHE, supra note 1, at 21-27. 
' See id. at 16-20. 
® See id. at 93-94. 
2003] NIETZSCHE & ARETAIC LEGAL THEORY 565 
recognition of indeterminacy in language, value, and meaning. 
The choice between master morahty and slave morahty, between 
competing sets of good and evil, is a free and fundamental one. 
The ordering of the moral world is a matter of willing it to be so. 
However, there is more to Nietzsche's prescription than this. 
Because Judeo-Christian religion claims the transcendental 
warrant of an all-powerful God, to see the possibility of a choice 
between two kinds of morality—^to position oneself, for the 
moment of choice, beyond good and evil—^requires a recognition 
that God is dead and a rejection of the authority of priests. 
Twenty-first century readers can manage this step more easily than 
most of Nietzsche's nineteenth century readers. But the next steps 
are much harder, because the ascetic ideal extends well beyond the 
boundaries of Judeo-Christian religion. The ascetic ideal is 
rephcated in both the deontological morality of Kant and in the 
scientific morality of the English Utihtarians. If we abjure the 
certainties of transcendental reason and natural science but 
replace them with nothing, then we have done nothing more than 
hasten the slide toward nihilism that is implicit in the ascetic ideal. 
This dilemma is acute for us because of our democratic distaste for 
the aristocratic ideal, and it is compounded by the fact that 
Nietzsche's descriptions of that ideal—including his references to 
"the blond beast" and the dominance of the Aryan race—are the 
passages that the Nazis found most congenial.' We need a 
different way to understand master morality and the aristocratic 
ideal. 
Current Anglo-American legal theory is caught in this very 
dilemma and displays this same need. American law, at least, is 
constitutionally cut off from the support of revealed rehgion. With 
one exception, which I will discuss below, deontological morality 
has never played a significant role in Anglo-American law or legal 
theory. This leaves empirical consequentialism as the mainstay, 
which takes many forms other than classic English Utilitarianism. 
One is the crude consequentiahsm of "pohcy analysis," in which 
the unrecognized and unexamined assumption is that law is a set of 
prescriptions that serve as incentive structures designed and 
administered to produce preferred states of affairs. The more self-
conscious and rigorous version of this consequentialist legal theory 
is, of course, law and economics. Nietzsche would have predicted 
a bad end for law and economics, because its commitment to an 
austere conception of truth would lead to nihilism. And Nietzsche 
would have been right. While it might seem that law and 
' See id. at 26. 
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economics has conquered the world, the truth is that in the last five 
years or so it has reached a point of exhaustion and contradiction 
that, amazingly enough, points us in the same direction that 
Nietzsche does, that is, toward aretaic legal theory.'" 
We have ample reason, then, to stop obsessing over 
indeterminacy and to take up Nietzsche's more central concerns. I 
propose to do this in the three Parts that follow. Part I considers 
the deontologjcal theory of punishment—^the one area in which 
Kant has had some influence in Anglo-American legal thought— 
and Nietzsche's criticism of it. Part II presents a virtue-based, or 
aretaic, theory of punishment as an alternative to both the 
deontological theory and the consequentiahst theory of 
punishment. Part III argues that Nietzsche's analysis of master 
and slave moraUty points toward the aretaic theory of punishment 
and, more broadly, to aretaic legal theory as a relatively 
unproblematic version of master morahty. In sum, to cast the 
theory of punishment in Nietzschean terms offers an escape from 
the ascetic ideal and nihihsm, an opportunity to recover the 
aristocratic ideal in Anglo-American legal theory, and a way to 
give post-modem legal theory a positive as well as a negative 
critique. 
I. THE DEONTOLOGICAL THEORY OF PUNISHMENT 
Nietzsche snickers at Kant's divorce of beauty from interest. 
The artist is sexually interested in his model, Nietzsche observes, 
and this has everything to do with the beauty the artist finds there. 
To suppose otherwise is to display the naivete of a country 
parson." But beneath its comic aspect, Kant's desiccated account 
of beauty is significant. The austerity of Kantian aesthetics tells us 
that it belongs to the ascetic ideal. Kant's conception of human 
rationality involves stripping human existence of its vitahty and 
suppressing one's inclinations to strength, engagement, and 
dominance in favor of a cool, insipid detachment that is 
indistinguishable from the weakness of slaves." 
Kantian morahty is vastly more interesting and complex than 
the morality of a country parson, but it is no less ascetic than the 
Kantian account of beauty. Just as Kant detaches interest fi"om 
See Kyron Huigens, Law, Economics, and the Skeleton of Value Fallacy, 89 CAL. L. 
REV. 537, 565-68 (2001) (reviewing BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass Sunstein 
ed., 2000)). 
See NIETZSCHE, supra note 1, at 79. 
See id. at 94-95. 
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beauty, he detaches the attributes and interests of human beings 
from his account of the human agent." For Kant, there is a bare 
will at the center of human agency, a faculty of rational choice that 
can commit one to action without the aid or influence of emotion, 
and without reference to one's other attributes such as strength or 
sexuahty.^'^ The Kantian account of responsibility rests on this 
austere conception of the will. Deprived of attributes, the will is 
unconstrained and free to choose the path that reason 
determines." This expands the scope of responsibility because it 
contracts the extent to which the agent might say, "I could not 
have done otherwise." Nietzsche connects Kantian morality to 
slave morahty and the ascetic ideal with the image of a bird of 
prey. 
[N]o wonder, then, if the entrenched, secretly smouldering 
emotions of revenge and hatred put this belief [in the agent as 
an austere subject] to their own use and, in fact, do not defend 
any belief more passionately than that the strong are free to be 
weak, and the birds of prey are free to be lambs:—^in this way, 
they gain the right to make the birds of prey responsible for 
being birds of prey " 
In this conception of responsibihty, Nietzsche locates the modem 
apparatus of punishment, including the nuances of intention, 
accident, and insanity." 
Nietzsche does not dispute that punishment as presently 
conceived tums on Kantian categories; his criticism is that 
punishments present functioning bears no relationship to 
punishment's origins. The Kantian account of responsibihty and 
punishment appropriates older forms and practices and has shaped 
them to new purposes." Nietzsche himself expresses little or no 
hope for the recovery of the older understanding of punishment, 
but it is important to see that if it could be recovered the resulting 
theory of punishment would represent a partial restoration of the 
aristocratic ideal. In the law that deals most immediately with 
right conduct and responsibihty, we would escape the influence of 
asceticism, begin to appreciate human beings fuhy for what they 
are, and replace the objective of oppressive control with the 
objective of human flourishing. 
The theory of punishment may be the only area in which 
Kantian morahty has had any substantial influence on Anglo-
See id. at 82-85. 
I'l See id. at 28. 
15 See id. at 28-29. 
15 Id. 
17 See id. at 42-43,58-59. 
15 See id. at 54-56. 
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American law and legal theory. The reason that this occurred is 
obscure, but part of the explanation is that Kant's English 
contemporary Jeremy Bentham advanced an influential theory of 
punishment that, while it was Utilitarian rather than deontological, 
was as strongly voluntaristic as Kant's theory of punishment. This 
was especially true of the Kantian and the Benthamite conceptions 
of criminal fault. Bentham argued that punishment must be 
confined to those criminal acts that are committed with a mens rea, 
construed as intentional state toward the act constituting the 
wrongdoing on the occasion of wrongdoing. Otherwise, Bentham 
thought, the justification of deterrence would not hold: no one can 
choose not to do something that he is unaware of doing.^' Kant's 
emphasis on the will as the seat of moral agency leads the Kantian 
theorist of punishment likewise to construe criminal fault in 
intentional terms. The argument is that one cannot be responsible 
for wrongdoing that is not freely chosen, and that one cannot 
choose to do wrong in the way required by responsibility if one is 
not fully aware of the nature or the consequences of one's 
conduct.^" This accord on the construction of criminal fault as a 
matter of intentional states made Anglo-American theorists, in 
their characteristic practical-minded eclecticism, at least tolerant 
of Kantian ideas that were not, strictly speaking congruent with 
consequentialism—^such as the justification of punishment by duty 
founded in reason alone.^^ As a result, one finds strained 
variations on Kantian themes in Anglo-American punishment 
theory—^notably consequentialist reconstructions of retribution as 
the welfare-enhancing satisfaction of an instinct for revenge.^^ 
More recently, genuine deontological theories of punishment have 
appeared in the Anglo-American literature.^^ 
The importation of Kantian morality into Anglo-American 
See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION 172-75 (J.H. Bums & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970) (1780). 
^ See Stephen J. Morse, The "Guilty Mind:" Mens Rea, in HANDBOOK OF 
PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 207, 211 (D.K. Kagehiro & W.S. Laufer eds., 1992) (describing 
the "just deserts" position as holding that "there is no blameworthiness unless there is an 
appropriate mental state such as intent or knowledge, that marks an actor's offending 
conduct as 'hers'"). See also Jerome Hall, Negligent Behavior Should Be Excluded from 
Penal Liability, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 632,634-35 (1963) (making such an argument). 
21 See JEROME MICHAEL & HERBERT WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS 
ADMINISTRATION: CASES, STATUTES AND COMMENTARIES 7-8 (1940) (discussing the 
Kantian theory of retribution as the justification for punishment). 
22 See 2 SIR JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF 
ENGLAND 80 (1883) (describing retribution as a welfare-enhancing diversion of the 
instinct toward revenge). 
22 See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW (1978); Jean 
Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA 
L. REV. 1659,1686 (1992). 
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theory of punishment has proved to be significant because, 
Bentham aside, the Anglo-American construction of criminal fault 
was not predominantly intentionalist. The fault category of 
malice, for example, had always included not only express 
malice—^an intention toward one's wrongdoing—^but also implied 
mahce—2l depraved disposition resulting in wrongdoing.^" But the 
trend in the last century, in America and in England, was toward 
the eradication of broad, dispositional categories of fault and the 
substitution of an intentional states analysis.^ So, for example, 
mistake of fact is now analyzed as a missing mem rea: The murder 
defendant who thought he was shooting a deer cannot have had 
the purpose to kill a human being; the absent-minded professor 
who takes someone else's raincoat in the good faith belief that it is 
his own has not even recklessly taken someone else's property, and 
so on.^® This is by no means an obvious or inevitable way to 
analyze mistake, and indeed it creates some serious anomalies^' 
^ See R.A. DUFF, INTENTION, AGENCY AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY: PHILOSOPHY OF 
ACTION AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 1-3,15-20 (1990) (describing the abolition by statute of 
constructive malice murder in England and its subsequent revival by the courts (citing R. 
V. Hyam, [1975] AC. 55)); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 7.1(a), at 653-55 (3d 
ed. 2000) (recounting the history of common law murder in terms of an expanding 
category of implied malice). 
^ See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02, cmt. 1 (1985) (explaining that "the Code's basic 
requirement that unless some element of mental culpability is proved with respect to each 
material element of the offense, no valid criminal conviction may be obtained"); Richard 
H.S. Tur, Subjectivism and Objectivism: Towards Synthesis, in ACTION AND VALUE IN 
CRIMINAL LAW 213 (Stephen Shute et al. eds., 1993) (assessing the increasing dominance 
of the intentionahst or subjectivist construction of criminal fault in England). 
See 1 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 62(b), at 245-52 (1984). 
^ The principal paradox is the acquittal of the unreasonably mistaken rapist, as 
illustrated in the case of Regina v. Morgan, 1976 A.C. 182 (H.L. 1976). In that case, the 
defendants claimed that they genuinely believed that the victim of a sequential rape, the 
wife of their commanding officer, had consented to have sex with them. The defendants 
claimed that they were extremely drunk, and that the commander persuaded them that his 
wife was "kinky," and that she would be "turned on" by being raped. In light of these 
representations, the defendants interpreted the victim wife's overt refusals and resistance 
to intercourse as consent. On an intentionalist construction of mistake and fault, the 
Morgan defendants were entitled to an instruction to acquit because (if the jury believed 
their story) the defendants lacked a mental state of purpose, knowledge, or recklessness 
regarding the victim's non-consent to intercourse—an essential element of rape. But these 
defendants were nevertheless at fault, and their fault lay in the combination of their 
particular circumstances, including their severe volimtary intoxication, their poor choice of 
friends, their evident abihty to make themselves believe whatever they found it convenient 
to believe, and a general moral obtuseness, £is evidenced by their failure to perceive not 
only a woman's genuine resistance to forced sexual intercourse but also the fact that even 
a simulated rape is an act degrading to human dignity. The Morgan defendants were 
denied a jury instruction to acqtiit based on their lack of any intentional state regarding 
nonconsent. This, the Law Lords held, was error, as implied by the intentionalist 
construction of fault. However, the Lords rejected that construction of fault in their 
disposition of the case. They affirmed the convictions because conviction and punishment 
were nevertheless consistent with reason and justice. See id. (appeal from the English 
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that a broader, dispositional inquiry into the reasonableness of the 
mistake is able to avoid.^® Nevertheless, the intentional states 
construction of fault has dominated the analysis of mistake. Given 
the increasing frequency with which Kant is cited in the Anglo-
American literature over the same period, in spite of his theory's 
poor fit in most respects,^' it seems likely that Kantian voluntarism 
reinforced this trend.'" 
However, the triumph of the intentional states construction of 
fault is far from complete and, at this juncture, its complete 
triumph seems unhkely. In spite of the efforts of a legion of 
reform-minded theorists during most of the last century, the 
doctrines of criminal negligence, felony murder, depraved heart 
murder, transferred intent, accomphce liability, unreasonable 
mistake, strict liabihty, and intoxication as a hmited defense still 
persist as prominent features in Anglo-American criminal law.'' 
They have been neither eradicated from criminal codes nor 
deprived of their essential characteristic: a non-intentional 
conception of fault consisting of a broad inquiry into the 
disposition and character of the accused, as those features might 
be inferred from his actions and the context in which they 
occurred." Once recognized, this situation appears as something 
Court of Appeals); see id. at 203-04 (Lord Cross); see id. at 214-15 (Lord Hailsham); see id. 
at 237-39 (Lord Fraser) (affirming rape convictions of several British military officers on 
these facts, citing the Criminal Appeal Act, 1968, c. 19, § 2(1) (Eng.), and authorizing the 
affirmance of convictions in spite of error when not inconsistent with justice). 
^ See Tur, supra note 25, at 219-22 (making this point regarding Morgan and similar 
cases). 
See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949) (reporting, "[rjetribution is no 
longer the dominant objective of the criminal law"). 
30 See Peter Brett, An Enquiry Into Criminal Guilt 51 (1960) (unpubUshed J.D. 
dissertation. Harvard University Law School) (on file with author) (describing Kant's 
conception of retribution); MICHAEL & WECHSLER, supra note 21; LLOYD L. WEINREB, 
CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, COMMENT, QUESTIONS 422-23 (1969) (excerpting Kant's 
account of retribution) (quoting IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF 
JUSTICE 100-01 (J. Ladd trans., 1965) (1797)); Hall, supra note 20, at 636 (citing Kant, 
among others, for the proposition that voluntariness is required for fault). 
31 See Kyron Huigens, Solving the Apprendi Puzzle, 90 GEO. L.J. 387, 420-23 (2002) 
(describing the persistence of these doctrines as evidence of the inadequacy of the 
intentional states construction of criminal fault). 
33 For example, from the point of view of the intentional states construction of fault, 
depraved mind murder is utterly baffling. See Bernard E. Gegan, More Cases of Depraved 
Mind Murder: The Problem of Mens Rea, 64 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 429, 432-37 (1990) 
(describing some courts' unsuccessful efforts to reduce the doctrine to recklessness). This 
is because the doctrine addresses a state of character instead of a state of mind. In such 
cases: 
It may become clear that the actor has a character flaw more blameworthy than 
that shown by a single indiscretion; it may even be established that he simply 
holds human life without value. This is not a specific mental state formed at the 
moment of action, such as intent or reckless disregard. Rather, it is an immoral 
predisposition to hcirm 
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of a theoretical crisis: Large portions of the criminal law are simply 
unexplained and unexplainable under either a consequentialist or 
a deontological theory of punishment because of those theories' 
commitment to an intentional states construction of fault. 
II. THE ARETAIC THEORY OF PUNISHMENT 
These fundamental difficulties in the criminal law require a 
fundamental solution—something on the order of an entirely new 
theory of punishment. Theories of punishment are conventionally 
said to be of two types: the deterrence theory of punishment and 
the retributive theory of punishment.^^ This typology is confused. 
Deterrence and retribution are not theories of punishment; they 
are functions of punishment—as are incapacitation, the concrete 
expression of public norms of behavior, the cathartic effect on the 
public of forcefully condemning violations of those norms, and so 
on. Neither deterrence nor retribution nor any of the other 
conceivable functions of punishment serves to justify punishment 
unless some moral theory grants that function justifying force. Nor 
does the function of deterrence or retribution explain wrongdoing, 
ground the excuses, solve the riddle of proportionahty, or answer 
any of the other questions that the practice of punishment poses. 
Any explanatory power that those functions have comes from a 
moral theory that weaves them into an explanation. Thus, what is 
commonly called the deterrence theory of punishment is more 
accurately described as the consequentialist theory of punishment. 
Consequentialism gives deterrence and the other social welfare-
promoting effects of punishment their justifying and explanatory 
power. The so-called retributive theory of punishment is better 
viewed as a deontological theory of punishment in which the duty 
of imposing retribution justifies punishment, and other, similarly-
grounded moral duties lie behind the excuses, the structure and 
Id. at 437. 
33 See JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 21-35 (1994) 
(presenting only utilitarian and retributive justifications for punishment by means of 
selections from Bentham and Kant, respectively); SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. 
SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES; CASES AND MATERIALS 102-19 (6th 
ed. 1995) (same); PAUL H. ROBINSON, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL LAW 32 (2d ed. 
1995) (quoting K. Greenawalt, Legal Ihinishment, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND 
JUSTICE 1337 (S. Kadish ed., 1983)) ("[t]he dominant approaches to justification [of 
punishment] are retributive and utilitarian"); RICHARD G. SINGER & MARTIN R. 
GARDNER, CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT: CASES, MATERIALS, AND READINGS IN 
CRIMINAL LAW 84-124 (2d ed. 1996) (presenting only utilitarian and retributive 
justifications for punishment by means of selections from Bentham and Kant, 
respectively). 
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content of criminal wrongdoing, and so on. 
If we view the theory of punishment this way, then a gap in 
the theoretical picture comes into view. Consequentialism and 
deontological morality are only two of the three major traditions 
in philosophical ethics.'" The third is virtue ethics, which begins 
with Aristotle and which is the subject of a burgeoning modem 
literature.'' An aretaic or virtue ethics theory of punishment was 
advanced as early as the 1970s and several partial accounts of it 
have been given since then.'® 
This theory of punishment is of interest to the student of 
Nietzsche because the Aristotelian conception of the responsible 
agent is richer than that of Kant.'^ Aristotle's rational agent is 
deeply deliberative, in the sense that he rationally considers not 
only how to achieve his desires, and not only whether his desires 
meet the demands of reason, but also the substance and content of 
^ See MARCIA W. BARON ET AL., THREE METHODS OF ETHICS; A DEBATE (1997). 
35 See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (Martin Ostwald trans., 1962). Virtue 
ethics was revived in modem philosophy by Anscombe, see G.E.M. Anscombe, Modem 
Moral Philosophy, reprinted in VIRTUE ETHICS 26 (Roger Crisp & Michael Slote eds., 
1997), and is the subject of extensive literature. See Roger Crisp & Michael Slote, 
Introduction, in VIRTUE ETHICS, supra, at 1, 3-4. See also ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE, ON 
VIRTUE ETHICS (1999); ALISDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (2d ed. 1997); JUSTIN 
OAKLEY, MORALITY AND THE EMOTIONS (1992); MICHAEL SLOTE, FROM MORALITY 
TO VIRTUE (1992); MICHAEL STOCKER, PLURAL AND CONFLICTING VALUES 338-42 
(1990); Justin Oaidey, Varieties of Virtue Ethics, 9 RATIO 128, 129 (1996); Michael 
Stocker, Values and Purposes: The Limits of Teleology and the Ends of Frien^hip, 78 J. 
PHIL. 747 (1981); Christine Swanton, Profiles of the Virtues, 76 PAC. PHIL. Q. 47 (1995); 
Christine Swanton, Satisficing and Virtue, 90 J. PHIL. 33 (1993). 
3® See Peter Arenella, Character, Choice, and Moral Agency, in CRIME, CULPABILITY, 
AND REMEDY 59, 61-65 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1990) (arguing that so-called 
rational choice theory is inadequate to describe the criminal law's concern with character); 
Qaire O. Frnkelstein, Duress: A Philosophical Account of the Defense in Law, 37 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 251, 252-53 (1995) (relying on Aristotle's conception of judgment to give an account 
of duress in terms of states of character); Kyron Huigens, Homicide in Aretaic Terms, 6 
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2002) [hereinafter Huigens, Homicide] (considering 
depraved heart murder and provocation in terms of an aretaic, or virtue-based, theory of 
punishment); Kyron Huigens, Rethinking the Penalty Phase, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1195 (2000) 
[hereinafter Huigens, Rethinking] (examining the constitutional regulation of death 
sentencing in terms of an aretaic theory of punishment); Kyron Huigens, The Dead End of 
Deterrence, and Beyond, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 943, 948 (2000) [hereinafter Huigens, 
Deterrence] (examining the nature of criminal fault in terms of an aretaic theory of 
punishment); Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1423, 1458-62 
(1995) [hereinafter Huigens, Virtue] (examining the justification of punishment in aretaic 
terms); Edmund L. Pincoffs, Legal Responsibility and Moral Character, 19 WAYNE L. 
REV. 905, 918 (1973) (arguing that punishment represents a demand that one develop and 
exhibit certain character traits). 
3^ This is tme on a conventional reading of Kant as advancing a deontological moral 
theory. Barbara Herman argues persuasively that this conventional reading is a 
misreading of Kant. BARBARA HERMAN, THE PRACTICE OF MORAL JUDGMENT (1993). 
Nancy Sherman argues in a similar vein that Kant's doctrine of virtue is closer than one 
might think to that of Aristotle. NANCY SHERMAN, MAKING A NECESSITY OF VIRTUE: 
ARISTOTLE AND KANT ON VIRTUE (1997). 
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his desires. Aristotle's rational agent considers the place of each 
of his desires in the context of his life as a whole. He considers his 
desires critically; he asks how he came to have them, whether he 
ought to have them at all, and whether some other desires might 
not serve him better. The rational agent's good, from this 
perspective, is much more than the simple satisfaction of desires 
and more than the rational self-mastery that Kant describes. The 
rational agent's good, in Aristotle's view, is to be to the fullest 
extent possible what each human being essentially is: a rational, 
active, and political being.^® 
One might ask, why should I create such a life rather than just 
satisfy my immediate desires? Here we encounter Aristotle's 
notion of a distinct kind of human flourishing. Our desires have a 
structure, because they are directed toward one end that we 
pursue for its own sake: eudaimonia. The word is often translated 
as "happiness," but eudaimonia, the final end and self-sufficient 
good, is better translated as "the best possible life" or "human 
flourishing." The best hfe or the highest human good depends on 
the characteristic function—^the ergon—of human beings, which 
Aristotle identifies as the ability to reason. Specifically, he 
concludes that the ergon of man is the life of rationality in action, 
as opposed to the mere possession of rationahty.®' The centerpiece 
of aretaic ethics is thus an exemplary practical rationality or 
practical wisdom—^in Greek, "phronesis." Phronesis is the ability 
to dehberate on and frame an overall conception of the good life— 
that is, the flourishing life—^and to integrate one's particular 
choices into this all-encompassing conception. The person 
possessed of phronesis, the phronimos, is a person of mature 
judgment who has the capacity to identify and pursue the good 
amid the contingencies of practical human affairs.'" 
Eudaimonia, then, is not mere contentment or satisfaction, 
but the attainment of distinctively human ends. We should hve a 
life of rationality in action not to conform with transcendental 
reason or to comply with duty, but because such a life is the best 
we can have."' In this light, to seek the satisfaction of the desires 
that I just happen to have would be unworthy; self-respect requires 
me to attend not only to my immediate desires, nor even just to my 
future desires, but primarily to the human capacities that underhe 
my desires. It makes sense for me, as a rational agent, to seek a 
hfe that draws on the greatest range of those capacities—a point 
^ See Huigens, Virtue, supra note 36, at 1447-49. 
See id. ax. 1449-52. 
See id. at 1454-56. 
5ee id. at 1450-52. 
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that John Rawls, following Aristotle, took as a starting point of his 
theory of justice.^^ 
This responsibility to oneself is the ground of all 
responsibility. Aristotle sees a direct connection between 
eudaimonia and life among others. The final good is self-
sufficient, he argues, in a special sense: 
[W]e define something as self-sufficient not by reference to the 
'self alone. We do not mean a man who lives his life in 
isolation, but a man who also lives with parents, children, a 
wife, and friends and fellow citizens generally, since man is by 
nature a social and political being."^ 
If one is mystified by this intimate cormection between one's final, 
highest good and political life, the confusion may be due to an 
unexamined assumption that serving the good of others or of all 
necessarily detracts from one's own. Aristotle's conception of 
eudaimonia and its cormection to the development of human 
capacities helps us to see an alternative sort of altruism. Aristotle 
describes friendship as concern for another in himself, because of 
himself, or because he is who he is. I am concerned with my friend 
as I am with myself. I care about his development and the scope of 
his life, just as I do for my own. Indeed, these concerns are 
indistinguishable; in seeking the good of my friend, I encounter 
additional opportunities for my own self-realization. Simply 
because humans live together rather than alone, the complete 
human life that I seek wiU entail a significant involvement with 
others and with the construction of their lives. The same principle 
extends beyond friendship to political life. "My self-realization 
requires political involvement because such involvement presents 
additional, necessary opportunities to draw upon and develop my 
human capacities.""" It is in this sense that Aristotle sees humans 
as essentially political animals. The virtuous life, for Aristotle, is 
the life of full involvement with the community's good. 
From Aristotle's conceptions of virtue and responsibility, one 
can derive a theory of punishment that resolves the longstanding 
tension between the consequentialist and deontological theories of 
punishment, with their nearly exclusive emphases on social welfare 
and retribution, respectively. More importantly, an aretaic, or 
virtue-based, theory of punishment solves the many doctrinal 
conundrums produced by the mistaken assumption that intentions 
Rawls uses what he calls the "Aristotelian Principle" as a principle of motivation in 
the original position. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 427-28 (1971). 
ARISTOTLE, supra note 35, at I.7.1097b; see id. at IX.9.1169b (reiterating that "man 
is a social and political being" in the context of discussing the relationship between 
friendship and happiness). 
Huigens, Virtue, supra note 36, at 1451-52. 
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are identical with criminal fault, instead of being merely indicative 
of criminal fault. 
One idea in Aristotelian ethics that modem readers find 
puzzling is Aristotle's attributing responsibility for character to the 
agent whose character it is."^ We tend to assume that we simply 
have the attitudes, propensities, and values that we have, as a 
product of our upbringing. From that perspective, responsibility 
for one's character seems an absurd notion. But Aristotle's richer 
conception of responsibility helps to make sense of his attribution 
of responsibihty for character. If I have the capacity to reflect on 
my ends, the means by which I would achieve them, and the 
relation of both to a whole life, then I have the capacity as well to 
shape my life in each particular decision that I make. I am 
responsible for my character to the extent I am responsible for the 
decisions I make about the ends and effects that shape it. My 
parents and teachers are responsible for the inculcation of virtue in 
me initially, but after a certain point that responsibihty becomes 
mine. 
The aretaic theory of punishment takes the inculcation of 
sound practical judgment—^virtue, in its correct, technical sense— 
to be the principal justifying purpose of punishment. Accordingly, 
criminal liability tums on Aristotle's attribution of responsibility 
for the state of one's character. The notion is that one deserves 
punishment if one has failed to intemalize legal rules sufficiently 
and to adjust one's standing motivations accordingly."® Where the 
capacity for this kind of control is absent, as in the case of insanity, 
we will excuse wrongdoing,"' but where a capable agent's 
disordered ends lead him into wrongdoing, we will punish the 
wrongdoing."® The inquiry into fault is precisely an inquiry into 
whether or not the agent's wrongdoing is a product of flawed or 
inadequate practical reasoning, including the practical reasoning 
that goes into making up one's ends. If so, and if the particular 
wrong done violates a legal prohibition, then punishment is both 
morally and legally justified. 
This conception of just deserts, or retribution, is far more 
robust than anything in the deontological theory of punishment. It 
is not premised on a duty to punish arising from another's 
violation of other, core moral duties. Virtue ethics is not premised 
on duties grounded in reason alone, but on a much broader notion 
"5 See id. at 1445-48 (citing TERENCE IRWIN, ARISTOTLE'S RRST PRINCIPLES § 182, at 
344 (1988)). 
See id. at 1458-62. 
See Huigens, Rethinking, supra note 36, at 1245-50. 
See Huigens, Deterrence, supra note 36, at 1028-31. 
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of human flourishing. It supposes that society engages in a process 
in which the attitudes and standing motivations conducive to that 
flourishing are recognized as virtues, and some of the rules that are 
conducive to the acquisition of these virtues are enacted as laws."' 
Punishment plays a role in the process of habituation to virtue 
because it instantiates the rules, displays them pubhcly, provides 
an incentive to abide by the rules until they are internalized, and 
secures the peace against those who cannot acquire virtue in order 
to enable those who can to do so. 
As the last two points indicate, consequences are not left out 
of account in the aretaic theory of punishment, but the theory is a 
significant advance over consequentiahst theories of punishment. 
The aretaic theory construes deterrence much as H.L.A. Hart did. 
Deterrence is not an economy of threats; it is a matter of 
internalized legal rules.^° The difference is that Hart saw the 
possibility of this internalization as merely a fortunate feature of 
rules that extends their consequential efficacy, and viewed not 
only fault, but the notion of moral justification of punishment in 
the individual case as a fundamental confusion.'" The aretaic 
theory of punishment, in contrast, construes the internalization of 
legal rules as part of a process of socialization that lies at the core 
of responsibility, fault, and the justification of punishment. 
The aretaic theory of punishment allows us to solve the 
conundrums created by the Kantian and Benthamite conception of 
criminal fault as intentional states because it provides an objective 
or non-intentional construction of criminal fault, and because it 
places a much greater emphasis on ex post adjudication over ex 
ante prescription than either the deontological or consequentialist 
theories of punishment do. To see this, consider the aretaic 
construction of wrongdoing and fault. 
Criminal wrongdoing consists of violating the criminal law's 
prohibitions. The prohibitory norms that make up the criminal 
law are generalizations about proper and improper conduct, drawn 
from generations of shared experience. Action-guiding legislation 
takes as its models those judgments about the proper course of 
action in problematic practical situations that are widely regarded 
See Huigens, Virtue, supra note 36, at 1454-56; Huigens, Deterrence, supra note 36, at 
1025-27. 
50 The term "economy of threats" describes deterrence that operates by explicit 
instrumental reasoning aimed at avoiding pain. H.L.A. HART, Legal Responsibility and 
Excuses, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 28, 
40-44 (1994). Hart contrasts this with deterrence that involves the internalization of legal 
rules as obligations that people incorporate into their other aims and plans. See id. at 44-
50. 
51 See id. at 35-40. 
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as sound judgments. The generalizations of these sound 
judgments are familiar to us, and almost uncontroversial: that 
property ought to be secure; that life and bodily integrity ought to 
be preserved; that individual autonomy ought to be respected; and 
so on. A criminal code is a relatively detailed set of positively 
enacted ethical generalizations of this kind." 
In the aretaic theory of punishment, fault is an aspect of 
wrongdoing and its adjudication is a necessary complement to the 
legislative enactment of these criminal prohibitions." Because 
they are generalizations of sound practical judgments in the 
relevant sphere of human conduct, each of the conduct rules of the 
criminal law presents an implicit demand that the accused should 
engage in sound practical reasoning in the circumstances in which 
such a crime might be committed. The requirement of fault entails 
a retrospective, adjudicative inquiry into this question. The 
question before the jury is whether the acts of the accused, in the 
particular circumstances of the alleged crime, displayed 
inadequate or flawed practical reasoning, including the 
deliberations on ends that have gone toward establishing and 
maintaining his attitudes and standing motivations. This 
determination by the jury turns on a comparison between the 
defendant's judgment in the relevant circumstances—as evidenced 
by the particular manner and circumstances of his wrongdoing— 
and a sound judgment in the relevant circumstances—as evidenced 
by the applicable conduct rules. This comparison between the 
defendant's judgment in the relevant circumstances and the sound 
judgment that is implicit in the applicable conduct rule leads to the 
inference of fault or no-fault. In this way, the justifying rationale 
of the conduct rule is brought to bear on the punishment of the 
individual offender." 
The inference of fault is a necessary step in the imposition of 
just punishment. Sound practical reasoning is context-dependent. 
That is, we cannot say what the right decision in any situation is, or 
was, unless we know not only what alternatives were available, but 
also the circumstances under which the choice was made. If part 
of the question before the jury is whether the defendant engaged 
in sound practical reasoning on the occasion of wrongdoing, then 
the conduct rule has to be returned to the level of specific, context-
rich practical judgment from which it arose, and in which the 
offender acted. The jury performs this specification of the conduct 
rule when it applies the law to the facts before it. This adjudicative 
See Huigens, Deterrence, supra note 36, at 1024-25. 
» See id. at 1028-31. 
^ See id. 
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specification of the norm complements the legislative 
generalization of the norm. If part of the justification of 
punishment is the inculcation and maintenance of sound practical 
judgment, then just punishment cannot be imposed unless and 
until this step is taken.'^ 
Fault, then, is a necessary inference drawn in adjudication to 
the effect that the person who has committed wrongdoing has 
done so in a way that calls the quality of his practical reasoning 
into question. Both intentional and non-intentional, or objective, 
fault work this way. In most cases, an intentional state regarding 
harm or a risk of harm denotes fault. However, this intentional 
state does not constitute fault. Fault consists of the way in which 
the accused has come to do wrong and the particular way in which 
he has done wrong. This fault may or may not be denoted by an 
intentional state on the occasion of action.'® 
The aretaic theory of punishment's account of non-intentional 
fault supplements the manifestly inadequate intentional-states 
conception of fault that is characteristic of deontological and 
consequentialist theories of punishment. The main benefit of this 
addition is not to provide a defense of doctrines such as felony 
murder or strict liability, but rather to clarify the reason that those 
doctrines seem unjust. Strict liability, for example, is often said to 
be criminal hability without fault, and is said to be unjust for that 
reason. But this is not quite right. In cases of strict liability, some 
kind of negligence—^non-intentional fault—^usually can be found in 
the transaction. The prosecution need not prove this fault 
explicitly, but therein lies the problem. Any moderately skilled 
prosecutor can convey this negligence to the jury in his case in 
chief, and needs no jury instruction to reap the benefit of that 
proof. Yet the defendant is deprived of any formal avenue of 
rebutting this implicit case. The problem in strict liability cases is 
thus neither liability without fault nor liability premised on non-
intentional fault. The problem is the covert, one-sided way in 
which non-intentional fault is proved. The injustice of strict 
liability is thus a problem pertaining to the principle of legality, not 
to the nature of fault. 
This clarification—^that many concerns that have been 
expressed in terms of the nature of fault are better framed as 
See id. at 1029-30. We refrain from punishing those who do wrong without fault 
because the inculcation of soimd practical judgment is one of the principal fimctions of 
punishment. It would be expressively irrational—even if it might be consequentially 
effective—^to punish one whose actions do evince soimd practical reasoning, even if these 
actions constitute a nominal violation of the prohibitory norm. See Huigens, Rethinking, 
supra note 36, at 1246-51. 
^ See Huigens, Deterrence, supra note 36, at 1029-30. 
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concerns about legality—^is an important one. We write rules 
about fault in terms of intentional states, not because this reflects 
anything about the nature of fault, but because such rules serve the 
rule of law better than rules written in non-intentional terms. This 
matters because we need to see that nothing in principle stops us 
from writing legally adequate rules about fault in non-intentional 
terms." Indeed, the constitutionalization of death sentencing is in 
large part an effort to do just this. The failures of that initiative 
are due almost entirely to the Supreme Court's failure to 
understand either that this is the objective or to understand the 
nature of fault itself.'® 
III. NIETZSCHE AND ARETAIC LEGAL THEORY 
Much of Nietzsche's description of punishment before the rise 
of ascetic philosophies brings to mind an aretaic conception of 
punishment based on the virtue ethics of Aristotle. Kantian 
punishment theory is inadequate to the task of explaining criminal 
fault in all its richness because Kantian morality is slave morality, 
and because it displays a cramped, desiccated conception of 
human agency and responsibihty." We have to go back to the 
origins of punishment and retrieve a different conception of 
agency and responsibihty in order to make sense of our actual 
practices in punishment. The Nietzschean conception of 
responsibility, hke the Aristotelian, is premised on an idea of 
human flourishing, and both philosophers advance a thick 
conception of human agency and responsibihty contrasts strongly 
with Kant's construction of the will. Not surprisingly, then, the 
aretaic theory of punishment fits Nietzsche's implicit description of 
an adequate theory of punishment. 
First, the aretaic theory of punishment is a product of the 
aristocratic ideal because it predates the rise of Judeo-Christian 
religion and subsequent ascetic philosophies, including 
deontological morahty and consequentialism. Second, aretaic 
legal theory describes punishment and responsibility in terms of 
the rational governance of desire and motivation, and not merely 
in terms of the will's rational mastery. Third, the concept of virtue, 
the heart of aretaic legal theory, rests on a notion of human 
flourishing that not only reiterates and expands upon Nietzsche's 
5'' See generally Huigens, Homicide, supra note 36 (describing this as a pressing task in 
criminal law theory and giving recent examples of how it ought and ought not to be done). 
See Huigens, Rethinking, supra note 36, at 1257-82. 
5' See NIETZSCHE, supra note 1, at 28-29,94-95. 
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account of master morality, but that also clears the notion of 
human flourishing of some of the unsavory associations that 
Nietzsche imposed on the idea. 
Nietzsche describes responsibility in terms of the will, but 
does not construe will as the bare capacity for choice, which is a 
late Kantian accretion on the idea.® Instead, Nietzsche refuses to 
divorce the will from the other attributes of human beings, and 
emphasizes the importance of strength and resolve to the will. 
Responsibility begins with the acquisition of memory and the 
capacity to make and keep promises.®^ The person who displays 
these attributes can free himself from the morality of custom and 
act as a sovereign, "an autonomous, supra-ethical individual 
(because 'autonomous' and 'ethical' are mutually exclusive)."" 
ResponsibUity is a matter of strength of will because the only one 
who can truly keep a promise is one who can withstand reversals 
of fortune. The strength of will that is required for the making and 
keeping of promises is conscience." 
Conscience is acquired through pain and is inculcated through 
the cruel imposition of suffering. "'A thing must be burnt in so 
that it stays in the memory ... that is a proposition from the oldest 
(and unfortunately the longest-lived) psychology on earth."® 
Ascetic philosophies obviously partake of these methods, but the 
methods predate those philosophies. Judeo-Christian rehgion 
posits a God to give meaning to suffering, but cruelty was first 
instrumental in inculcating the rudiments of responsibihty. 
Significantly, this kind of governance takes hold at the level of 
motivation and desire. Responsibility is not a matter of choosing 
in accord with the dictates of reason; it substantially predates such 
a conception of reason. 
[T]hink of old German punishments such as stoning... 
breaking on the wheel... impaling, ripping apart and trampling 
to death by horses ("quartering"), boiling of the criminal in oil 
or wine ... , the popular flajang ("cutting strips"), cutting out 
flesh from the breast; and, of course, coating the wrong-doer 
with honey and leaving him to the flies in the scorching sun. 
With the aid of such images and procedures, man was 
eventually able to retain five or six "I-don't-want-to's" in his 
memory, in connection with which a promise had been made, in 
order to enjoy the advantages of society—^and there you are! 
With the aid of this sort of memory, people finally came to 
^ See id. at 43. 
See id. at 39-40. 
Mat40. 
® See id. at 41-42. 
® Id. at 41. 
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"reason"!^' 
One should not overlook the significance of the term "I-don't-
want-to's." For Nietzsche, the original conception of responsibility 
is a matter of what one does and does not want to do—a matter of 
desire and motivation—not a matter of whether one chooses in 
accordance with reason's dictates on the occasion of action. 
Just as the Kantian conception of responsibility is a late 
accretion on a quite different conception of responsibility, so is the 
Kantian conception of retribution. In the deontological theory of 
punishment, retribution is required in response to wongdoing 
because the wrongdoer has chosen to set himself against society 
and above his victim, thereby implying a principle of action that 
applies to himself, which in turn implies his exclusion from the 
rights of society and his degradation through punishment.®* 
However, long before this abstract conception of retribution 
developed, retribution was a matter of payment of debt in which 
"the creditor takes part in the rights of the masters: at last he, too, 
shares the elevated feeling of despising and maltreating someone 
as an 'inferior' Even the familiar conception of retribution 
as revenge that has been tamed and civilized is wrong in 
Nietzsche's view. Punishment has to do with the emotions, 
Nietzsche argues, but not with reactive emotions such as revenge. 
Instead, it has to do with the active emotions such as a lust for 
power and possessions. Justice originates with the moral 
aristocracy, "the strong, the spontaneous and the aggressive," who 
"have partly expended their strength in trying to put a stop to the 
spread of reactive pathos...."®® 
Everywhere that justice is practised and maintained, the 
stronger power can be seen looking for means of putting an end 
to the senseless ravages of ressentiment amongst those inferior 
to it (whether groups or individuals), partly by lifting the object 
of ressentiment out of the hands of revenge, partly by 
substituting, for revenge, a struggle against the enemies of 
peace and order, partly by working out compensation, 
suggesting, sometimes enforcing it, and partly by promoting 
certain equivalences for wrongs into a norm which ressentiment, 
from now on, has to take into account.®' 
These efforts on the part of the moral aristocracy turn 
punishment into the opposite of revenge—^into an impersonal 
« Id.aXAl .  
« See Hampton, supra note 23, at 1686-87 (describing retribution as vindicating the 
victim's worth in part by degrading the wrongdoer). 
6' NIETZSCHE, supra note 1, at 45. 
68 Id. at 53. 
® Id. 
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matter of retribution in which descriptions of "just" and "unjust" 
exist after the creation of a legal system, and not before it.™ 
Describing roughly the same arc of history—^from the origin 
of punishment in notions of debt to a sophisticated legal 
retributivism—^Nietzsche describes the succession of meanings 
attributed to the experience of being punished. He describes the 
experience of those who originally experienced punishment as a 
kind of resignation to fate or misfortune and claims that they 
would have felt only sadness at the turn of events.^^ In the first 
dawnings of critical awareness, the moral aristocracy would have 
sought to turn punishment to other ends: 
[W]e must certainly seek the actual effect of punishment 
primarily in the sharpening of intelligence, in a lengthening of 
the memory, in a will to be more cautious, less trusting, to go 
about things more circumspectly from now on, in the 
recognition that one was, once and for all, too weak for many 
things, in a sort of improvement of self-assessment.™ 
However, Nietzsche concludes, all that actually can be 
accomplished is an increase of fear and a mastering of desires. 
Punishment cannot make man better; it can only tame him and 
make him stupid.™ Among the other accretions of meaning on 
punishment—^not only Kantian retribution, but also deterrence, 
festival, incapacitation, and racial or social purity—^Nietzsche 
singles out one construal of punishment's purpose as especially 
disappointing: the inculcation of bad conscience, the feeling of 
guilt that might enable the convict to govern himself properly in 
the future. Nietzsche observes how unlikely it is that punishment 
eould lead to such a result. The prisoner either becomes harder 
and more resistant to change or he is completely debased and 
acquires "a dry, morose solemnity."™ 
At this point, we ought to set aside Nietzsche's own pessimism 
and appreciate the extent to which he has uncovered a conception 
of punishment that is independent of Judeo-Christian religion and 
deontological morality. At the conclusion of the Genealogy'^ 
sections on punishment in section 15 of Essay II, Nietzsche focuses 
on the act of punishment, and it is not surprising that this induces 
pessimism. But we ought to back up a few sections, to section 11, 
and recognize, as Nietzsche does there, that it is legal theory and 
doctrine, not the immediate instrumentalities of punishment, that 
See id. at 54. 
71 See id. at 59. 
72 Id. at 60. 
73 See id. 
7" Id. at 59. 
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matter the most to society. It makes sense, then, temporarily to set 
aside the problems at the sharp end of the practice and rethink 
punishment starting at the other, speculative end. We are after a 
legal theory that meets the aristocratic ideal and that provides a 
solution to doctrinal problems in the criminal law such as the 
proper construction of fault. Whether or not punishment can ever 
do anything but make men stupid is a question that we can set 
aside for the moment. 
What of the sadness that the original offenders are said to 
have felt?" It is, apparently, not yet remorse, but only regret. The 
law could not inculcate conscience and these offenders did not 
have it. Their response to punishment was not reflective and they 
did not engage in the kind of conscientious self-governance that 
features remorse. But this is not to say they were not governed by 
law. They were governed, Nietzsche argues, by the experience and 
image of punishment's cruelty, from which they could acquire a 
handful of "I-don't-want-to's." That is, they could and did 
undergo a certain amount of shaping at the level of their desires 
and motivations." 
This level of unconscious obedience cannot be recovered, and 
we have no need to recover it. We rightly regard the prospect of 
the law's governing by means of subliminal conditioning with 
horror. But the next step in the historical progression—^the moral 
aristocracy's conception of punishment as governing us just 
beneath the level of the rational determination of the will—^is 
eminently recoverable. Indeed, in light of Kant's desiccated 
conception of the will and the influence it has had on Anglo-
American legal theory and doctrine, we would do well to recover 
this pre-Kantian conception of punishment and responsibility. But 
if we are to describe governance, not only of the will, but also of 
desire, then we must employ a richer conception of human agency, 
one that integrates the other attributes of the human agent—^her 
strength, her sexuality, her imagination—^into our conceptions of 
action and responsibility. This integration will lead us, one hopes, 
to the moral aristocracy's rich conception of punishment's 
effects—"the sharpening of intelligence, in a lengthening of the 
memory, in a will to be more cautious, less trusting, to go about 
things more circumspectly from now on""—^between the original 
conditioning by cruelty and the "dry, morose solemnity" of 
Kantian self-mastery. 
The moral aristocracy's critically aware assessment of 
See id. 
See id. at 42. 
77 Id. at 60. 
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punishment is just that which Nietzsche describes as unattainable 
in 11.15: the account of punishment's effects as including the 
enhancement of memory, a will to caution and circumspection, and 
a more accurate self-assessment, including a sense of one's 
weakness in many areas of life.™ Nietzsche concludes that these 
things are not attainable through punishment, and that only the 
mastery of desire through fear is possible. But again, it is 
advisable to set aside Nietzsche's pessimism so that we can 
examine what is offered here. Nietzsche describes rational 
governance at the level of desire—^not merely the mastery of 
desire in the Kantian sense of its subjection to reason by will, but 
the shaping of desire—^the deliberate, reflective acquisition of 
attitudes and dispositions to caution, to circumspection, to 
modesty, to introspection, and so on. This is a conception of 
punishment's effects that falls between the rational governance of 
the bare will and the conditioning of the agent subliminally 
through terror. It contemplates the rational governance of desire 
through the acquisition of a set of standing motivations. It 
contemplates punishment as a process of inculcating the virtues. 
In short, the conception of punishment that Nietzsche has invoked 
here is an aretaic theory of punishment. 
We need not share Nietzsche's pessimism about such an 
understanding of punishment. Punishment can do no more than to 
make men stupid.™ Punishment need not merely harden the 
p r i sone r  o r  fo r ce  h im  in to  " a  d ry ,  mo ro se  so l emn i ty .Un l ike  
Nietzsche, we do not live in a society dominated by Christianity; 
we live in a world that has to a great extent rediscovered an 
appreciation for the merely human, as Nietzsche advocated. And 
we have concrete reasons to be more optimistic about the 
prospects for genuine punishment, especially under the guidance 
of an aretaic theory of punishment. 
For example, the United States has actively promoted the 
creation of drug treatment courts in local and state jurisdictions 
around the country. In these courts, the offender pleads guilty to a 
drug offense, but sentencing is suspended pending his completion 
of a drug treatment program. Upon successful completion, his 
conviction is vacated and all charges are dropped. Inevitable 
lapses during the course of treatment are dealt with by a system of 
graduated sanctions in which termination of the program and 
incarceration are the last resort. Political conservatives attack 
drug treatment courts because the offenders do not seem to 
See id. 
See id. 
80 Id. at 59. 
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receive their just deserts. Political liberals attack drug treatment 
courts because the loss of liberty and pain inflicted as part of the 
treatment is degrading to the offender in a way that incarceration 
is not: it addresses him patemalistically, as an invalid or an 
incompetent, instead of as a responsible peer. The aretaic theory 
of punishment answers both sets of objections by portraying drug 
treatment as genuine punishment inflicted as retribution for past 
wrongdoing.®^ 
The key point in this analysis is that an aretaic theory of 
punishment allows us to draw a distinction between two kinds of 
rehabiUtation. Therapeutic rehabilitation addresses pathology, 
whereas aretaic rehabilitation consists of habituation to virtue, 
which is a feature of normal human development. Neither the 
development of a good character nor our efforts to improve 
character address illness. Indeed, the possibility of affecting 
character in these ways as well as the responsibihty premised on 
this possibiUty presupposes that one is mentally and physically 
healthy. This distinction is important, because it turns out that 
drug treatment involves at least as much character-building as it 
does the medical and psychoanalytic treatment of pathological 
alcohol and drug use. The former serves as a necessary base of 
support for the latter. For example, one court-supervised 
treatment program includes classes in substance abuse and relapse 
prevention, but it also includes classes in anger manapment, 
effective social communication, and ethnic contributions to 
civilization.®^ These latter classes do not address pathologies; they 
are aimed at improved character: a temperate disposition, the 
ability to listen to others and to speak without rancor, and the self-
esteem that comes from a consciousness of one's ties to a larger 
community and history. In short, much of the programming 
received in drug treatment courts is aimed at enabling the 
defendant to meet the very responsibihty that is at the heart of 
desert: the responsibility for the state of his character. Given that 
this is done because of a criminal conviction and against the 
offender's will, it is genuine punishment. But it is punishment that 
does more than make people stupid or morose. 
81 See Kyron Huigens, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and Theories of Punishment: A 
Response to Brown, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1,22 (2002). 
82 See ADELE FIARRELL, SHANNON CAVANAGH & JOHN ROMAN, THE URBAN 
INSTITUTE: FINAL REPORT: FINDINGS FROM THE EVALUATION OF THE D.C. SUPERIOR 
COURT DRUG INTERVENTION PROGRAM 1 (1998). 
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CONCLUSION 
It may seem inconsistent with the grand spirit of Nietzschean 
philosophizing to give a Nietzschean account of mundane matters 
such as strict liabihty or drug treatment courts. The tendency 
lately has been instead to envision a fundamental shift in human 
perception as the first step in political reform. But in addition to 
the manifest futihty of that strategy, one ought to be able to see 
that the way in which aretaic legal theory resolves hardened 
dilemmas and transcends entrenched political positions is its most 
Nietzschean feature. Nietzsche sought to overcome nihilism by 
breaking down existing categories. His perspectivism is an 
important part of this project, and until now, Ms perspectivism has 
played the largest role of any of his ideas in Anglo-American legal 
theory. The aretaic theory of punishment is part of this tradition, 
and yet it breaks down existing categories to a purpose beyond 
reiterating endlessly that language, value, and meamng are 
indeterminate and mampulable. It offers specific concepts, 
analyses, doctrinal innovations, and policy prescriptions to replace 
existing categories with a view to making law contribute more 
effectively to the good life. To see this as contrary to Nietzsche's 
project is to overemphasize Ms perspectivism and to ignore Ms 
concern with overcommg modern slave morality and nihilism 
tMough the recapture of the aristocratic ideal. Human flourishing 
is part of that latter ideal, and it is as solid a basis as any for a new 
legal order. 
